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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of environmental innovations on firm profitabil-
ity with respect to differences between small and medium-sized (SME) and large
(LE) enterprises. Using data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 2015, re-
sults show that, in general, SME benefit more from environmental innovations than
LE. This effect is particularly strong for resource efficiency-improving innovations
induced by regulation. These environmental innovations are significantly related to
an increase in profits of SME, whilst related to a decrease in profits of LE. A ro-
bustness check with data from the MIP 2009, however, does not confirm this result
as the effect for LE is insignificant and differences between the two groups cannot
be found in this survey wave. A reason why negative effects for LE are observed
in the MIP 2015 - but not in the MIP 2009 - might be that most LE had already
exploited the potentials of environmental innovations when they were surveyed in
the MIP 2015. This is supported by evidence suggesting that size-related differences
in the MIP 2015 are driven by a negative relationship between LE’s profits and en-
vironmental innovations related to externalities that were reduced by innovations
in periods before.
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1 Introduction
Climate change, resource scarcity and an increasing environmental pollution call for in-
vestments in environmentally friendly technologies. Porter (1991) and Porter & van der
Linde (1995) argue that regulation1 can stimulate necessary environmental innovations
(EI). However, a common perspective by economists is that regulation restricts firms and
shifts away productive investments to pollution abatement costs (Palmer et al. 1995, Testa
et al. 2011). Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) also claim that this is not
necessarily the case. Environmental regulation can additionally increase firm profitability,
as environmental pollution may result from an inefficient use of resources and environ-
mental regulation can point out potential technological improvements, which increase
productivity. Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014) prove that the validity of this assumption de-
pends on whether regulation stimulates resource efficiency improvements, defined here as a
reduction of energy, water or other material use per unit of output. They show empirically
that only environmental process innovations which improve resource efficiency including
innovations triggered by regulation are related to an increase, while other environmental
process innovations are related to a decrease in firm profitability.
I propose that, aside from resource efficiency improvements, firm size additionally af-
fects profitability gains of regulation-induced environmental innovations. I assume this
because smaller firms show different innovation patterns in comparison to larger firms
(Acs & Audretsch 1988). Those differences may also exist for environmental innovations
(Klewitz & Hansen 2014). Furthermore, Becker et al. (2013) and Evans (1986) find that
regulation imposes less pollution abatement costs on smaller firms. Moreover, they often
lack information about potential resource efficiency improvements (Constantinos et al.
2010, Rahbauer et al. 2016). If environmental regulation signals firms how to increase ef-
ficiency (Anderson & Ullah 2014, Ambec et al. 2013), the benefits from information gains
could be higher in smaller firms, as there is less knowledge about potential resource effi-
ciency improvements. Therefore, the effect of especially regulation-induced and resource
efficiency-improving environmental innovations on firm profitability could be larger for
smaller firms. However, the role of firm size for profitability gains of environmental inno-
vations has not been analyzed yet.
This paper attempts to fill this gap. I look at four types of environmental innovation, fol-
1 This study summarizes all policy instruments defined as command-and-control instruments or
market-based instruments as environmental regulations and does not distinguish between both kinds
of policy instruments.
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lowing Rexha¨user and Rammer (2014): regulation-induced resource efficiency innovation,
regulation-induced other environmental innovation, voluntary resource efficiency innova-
tion and voluntary other environmental innovation, and analyze whether their effect on
firm profitability, which is measured by return on sales (ROS), depends on firm size. I
apply data from two waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), consisting in total
of 6,303 German firms. The MIP 2015 is used for the main analysis and the MIP 2009
additionally for robustness checks. SME are defined as firms with less than 250 employees
and less than e50 Million of annual sales.
The results confirm the assumption for the MIP 2015 wave. Environmental innovations
are positively correlated with ROS only in SME. Moreover, an interaction term between
the logarithmized number of employees and environmental innovations reveals that the
positive effect of environmental innovations significantly decreases if the number of em-
ployees increases. Differentiating between the four types of environmental innovations
shows that the positive effect in SME is solely related to innovations that improve re-
source efficiency and are regulation-induced. Moreover, the same type of innovation has
a significantly negative influence in LE. The analysis of the MIP 2009 wave also shows
only positive effects for SME. However, the interaction term does not show any significant
size-related differences in this period.
Increasing size-related differences between both waves can be explained by a robustness
check where evidence suggests that it gets more difficult after a while for LE to find
EI that are profitable. This is because, in this group former environmental innovations
negatively influence the profitability of current environmental innovations if they belong
to the same dimension of environmental benefits. However, most firms, of small and large
size, started to implement EI in 2009, therefore no size-related differences exist in this
period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes previous em-
pirical findings regarding the Porter hypothesis and size-dependent differences between
firms. Data, theoretical approach and estimation strategy are described in section 3. Sec-
tion 4 presents the main findings and section 5 further robustness checks. Results and
study limitations are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Porter hypothesis and size-dependent differ-
ences regarding environmental innovations
2.1 The Porter hypothesis
Studies that build on Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) divide their hy-
pothesis into three versions: a weak version (A), a narrow version (B) and a strong version
(C) (Ambec et al. 2013). (A) The weak version merely claims that environmental regu-
lation spurs innovation. Several studies confirm the weak version (Jaffe & Palmer 1997,
Brunnermeier & Cohen 2003, Arimura et al. 2007, Horbach 2008, Horbach et al. 2012,
Ambec et al. 2013). Studies also show that larger firms are more likely to implement an
environmental innovation than smaller firms (Triguero et al. 2013, Horbach et al. 2012).2
However, these studies do not consider that LE are generally more likely to implement an
innovation because of their size. (B) The narrow version postulates that (”...) flexible reg-
ulatory policies [market-based instruments] give firms greater incentives to innovate and
thus are better than prescriptive forms [command-and-control instruments] of regulation”
(Ambec et al. 2013, p.5).3 According to my knowledge, there are no studies on the narrow
version mentioning firm size issues. (C) The strong version states that properly designed
regulations will offset compliance costs due to technological improvements (Porter 1991,
Porter & van der Linde 1995). The strong version is the most relevant for firms, as
it includes economic improvements. Therefore, I focus on related size-dependent issues.
Empirical studies of the strong version show ambiguous results. Cohen & Tubb (2018)
find in a meta-analysis of 108 studies analyzing the strong version that those employing
a lagged regulatory variable as well as those observing profitability changes on a country
level are more likely to confirm the strong version. Analyzing 3,618 firms based on the
MIP 2009, Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014, p.145) find that ”(...) the Porter hypothesis
does not hold in general for its strong version, but depends on the type of environmental
innovation” and resource efficiency improvements are crucial for an increase in profitabil-
ity. Ghisetti & Rennings (2014) come to the same conclusion by using MIP 2009 data as
explanatory variables, but dependent variables from the MIP 2011. Investigating a water
withdrawal regulation in Germany, Stoever & Weche (2018) find that the regulation in
question does not affect firms’ overall profitability, even though it increases investments
in integrated (resource efficiency-improving) technologies. Different outcomes between
2 Triguero et al. (2013) only distinguish between small and medium-sized firms.
3 Originally, the Porter hypothesis was built-up on market-based instruments (Porter & van der Linde
1995, Ambec et al. 2013).
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Stoever & Weche’s (2018) and Rexha¨user & Rammer’s (2014) study, however, indicate
that the type of environmental innovation (i.e. resource efficiency-improving vs. others)
is not the only factor which influences the effect of environmental innovations on firm
profitability.
2.2 Size-dependent differences
Analyzing sustainability-oriented innovation of SME, Klewitz & Hansen (2014, p.59) argue
that ”SME will innovate differently than larger companies because they possess distinct
organizational structures and capabilities.” In the following, arguments that explain why
size-dependent differences exist are presented.
SME and LE differ in general by the following aspects: First, unit costs of EI
might be higher in smaller firms in the presence of economies of scale (Stigler 1958, Var-
ian & Buchegger 2004). This would affect SME profits negatively.4 Second, innovation
activities of SME and LE respond differently to the same technological and economic
environment according to Winter (1984) and Acs & Audretsch (1988). For example,
innovation activities of smaller firms profit more from spillovers of technological knowl-
edge generated by others (R&D spillovers) (Acs et al. 1994). Moreover, Vossen (1998)
states that SME and LE possess characteristics that lead to different relative advantages.
Smaller firms, for example, may profit from shorter decision chains and a lower level of
bureaucracy. Larger firms may often possess the ability to support the establishment of
large R&D laboratories and the ability to spread risk over a portfolio of projects. Both,
different responses to the technological and economic environment as well as different rel-
ative advantages could also be valid for environmental process innovations and may cause
a difference in the profitability of EI, however, ex ante it is not possible to state which
group profits more.
Regulation may affect SME and LE differently. Dean et al. (2000) consider three
types of legislative asymmetries: (A) compliance asymmetries, (B) statutory asymmetries
and (C) enforcement asymmetries. (A) Compliance asymmetries result from differences
in compliance costs per unit of output. Compliance costs are all expenses that a firm
makes in order to follow regulation.5 An advantage for LE exists, for example, when
4 An employee that is exclusively dedicated to environmental issues like ”waste reduction” is one
example here.
5 Compliance costs include salaries of people working in compliance, time or money spent on reporting
and approval costs as well as investments required to meet the regulation targets.
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total compliance costs are the same for all firms. Hence, they are less per unit for LE.6
(B) Statutory asymmetries result from an unequal legislation for smaller and larger firms.
They are included in most European and German environmental laws and are supposed to
level the playing field between SME and LE.7 Thus, if properly designed, they counterbal-
ance compliance asymmetries. (C) Enforcement asymmetries exist when environmental
law is unequally enforced by firm size. From a government’s perspective, environmental
improvement is less costly when a large firm is enforced, which pollutes relatively more,
instead of many small firms as ”(...) there are sizable fixed costs [paid by the government]
involved in each investigation” (Dean et al. 2000, p.59). Hence, large firms might be
enforced more often as the government wants to reduce its spending. In addition, large
firms might be more exposed to environmental regulation due to sector-specific differences
as well. Different kinds of industries show different pollution levels and industries that
cause more environmental pollution often have a higher share of LE (Constantinos et al.
2010). Becker et al. (2013) find that the net effect of all legislative asymmetries disadvan-
tages larger firms. The study, however, considers only abatement costs. The current work
aims to connect size-dependent differences of pollution abatement costs with the Porter
hypothesis by analyzing whether regulation also causes a size-dependent profitability of
environmental innovation.
Differences regarding the influence of regulation on resource efficiency im-
provements are likely because of the following issues: SME often lack knowledge regard-
ing potential resource efficiency improvements (Constantinos et al. 2010, Mattes et al.
2015) and implement resource efficiency-improving environmental innovations less often
than large firms (Mattes et al. 2017).8 For example, in a survey dealing with compliance
issues related to the British low carbon agenda with 141 SME in Derbyshire, Rahbauer
et al. (2016) find that smaller firms struggle with target settings for energy consump-
tion and waste outputs. Vernon et al. (2003) state that SME are rather reactive to
environmental regulations than proactive. Accordingly, regulation may help (especially
smaller) firms to overcome organizational inertia (Ambec & Barla 2002). Moreover, regu-
lation may inform firms about resource inefficiencies (Ambec et al. 2013) and there is less
knowledge about potential resource efficiency improvements in SME. Thus, regulation
and regulation-related information gains may help especially SME to increase resource
6 The issue resulting from economies of scale is comparable to the one resulting from compliance
asymmetries.
7 For example, the German Immission Control Act (BImSchG; Gesetz zum Schutz vor scha¨dlichen
Umwelteinwirkungen durch Luftverunreinigungen, Gera¨usche, Erschu¨tterungen und a¨hnliche
Vorga¨nge) includes special arrangements for combustion plants below a certain size.
8 It is not stated whether this result is influenced by regulation.
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efficiency and profitability.
Table 1 summarizes all differences and their effects on a diverging profitability of EI.
Ex ante, the effect of general differences is ambiguous. This is because, even though
economies of scale advantage larger firms, differences in the response to the technologi-
cal and economic environment as well as relative advantages may offset negative effects.
The effect of legislative asymmetries is also ambiguous ex ante, as each asymmetry either
advantages LE or SME and it cannot be predicted which asymmetry has the strongest
influence. However, Becker et al. (2013) find higher pollution abatement costs for larger
enterprises. Therefore, I assume that legislative asymmetries rather advantage SME.
Moreover, smaller firms should profit relatively more from regulations providing informa-
tion gains related to resource efficiency improvements. Hence, regulation-induced resource
efficiency innovations should show higher effects on profitability in SME compared to LE.
Table 1: Differences between SME and LE and how they affect the profitability of EI
Type of Difference Affected EI types Effects on profitability difference be-
tween SME and LE
General differences
Economies of scale all types advantage for LE
Response to tech. & econ. environment all types ambiguous
Relative advantages all types ambiguous
Total all types ambiguous
Legislative asymmetries
Compliance asymmetries regulation advantage for LE
Statutory asymmetries regulation ambiguous, rather advantage for SME
Enforcement asymmetries regulation advantage for SME
Total regulation ambiguous, rather advantage for SME
Differences regarding the influence of regulation
on resource efficiency improvements
regul. & resource advantage for SME
3 Empirical framework and data
In the following, I illustrate my empirical approach. I describe the model I use, my
empirical strategy as well as the applied data. Additionally, I provide the descriptive
statistics.
6
3.1 Model
The model I use is based on the work of Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014)9 and analyzes
the effect of EI on firm profitability. Pre-tax return on sales (ROS), defined as profits
divided by return, is used to measure the latter. Moreover, the model includes firm and
market-specific characteristics as additional explanatory variables. The effect of EI is
analyzed with respect to product differentiation (PD), efficiency gains through regular
process innovations (PC), competition intensity (CP), a firm’s knowledge stock (KS), a
firm’s cost structure (CS) and a set of further control variables to account for sector-
specific and regional heterogeneity (C). The econometric model is illustrated in equation
(1):
ROSi,t = α+βEIi,t +γ1PDi,t +γ2PCi,t +γ3CPi,t +γ4KSi,t +γ5CSi,t + +γ6Ci,t + i,t (1)
3.2 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy includes two steps:
1. In the first step, I estimate whether the implementation of an environmental inno-
vation is related to higher profits. The aim of this step is to analyze if size-specific
differences exist regardless of the EI type. Accordingly, differences in the effects of
resource efficiency improvements and regulation are not considered yet.
2. In the second step, I split environmental innovations into the four types—in regulation-
induced as well as voluntary ones and then further into resource and other innova-
tions: regulation & resource (RR), regulation & other (RO), voluntary & resource
(VR), voluntary & other (VO). In this step, I aim to identify whether size differences
differ for types of environmental innovation. Hence, the EI variable in equation (1)
is replaced by four EI variables as illustrated in equation (2):10
ROSi,t = αi + β1RRi,t + β2ROi,t + β3V Ri,t + β4V Oi,t + (...) + i,t (2)
To observe differences between SME and LE, four different estimations are conducted in
each step. The first three are based on equation (1). The first estimation includes all
9 For a detailed explanation of the model look in Rexha¨user & Rammer’s (2014) study.
10 All other model variables are summarized by (...).
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observations, the second analyzes only SME and the third only LE. The forth estimation is
based on equation (3), which is an extension of equation (1). Firm size (S) is added here as
an additional variable as well as an interaction term between firm size and environmental
innovation. S is measured by the logarithmized number of employees. In the first step,
the forth estimation is conducted as illustrated. In the second step, the EI interaction
term is replaced by products between each innovation type and the logarithmized number
of employees.
ROSi,t =α + β1EIi,t + β2EIi,t ∗ Si,t + β3Si,t + (...) + i,t (3)
The interpretation of the environmental innovation variable in equation (3) is different
from equation (1). It measures ROS when the logarithmized number of employees is
’zero’. Thus, when the number of employees is ’one’. The coefficient of the firm size
variable measures the effect on ROS in the absence of environmental innovation. The
interaction term captures how the effect of environmental innovations changes when the
number of employees increases.11
Furthermore, I use an interval-censored regression model because firms do not report the
exact percentage of ROS in the MIP, but they report ROS-intervals - e.g. between 0%
and 2%. Hence, the applied dependent variable is ordinal-scaled. Therefore, an ordinary
least-squares (OLS) regression model cannot be used. However, as interval limits of ROS
are known, an interval-censored regression can be applied (Verbeek 2008), which is best
described as an ordered probit model with known interval limits. According to Wooldridge
(2002), the estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as partial effects.
3.3 Data and variable description
3.3.1 Data
German data of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)12, which is an annual survey con-
ducted in panel format by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), is used.13
11 I choose the logarithmized number of employees as an interaction term and not an SME-LE dummy
because the extra information that the SME-LE dummy would provide is similar to the information
from a comparison of the second and third estimation with a Wald test.
12 See Peters & Rammer (2013) for details on the survey.
13 Germany is selected for the analysis because it possesses comparatively high regulation standards in
the EU (Rexha¨user & Rammer 2014). Furthermore, the environmental law of the European Union
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The MIP is the German contribution to the European Commission’s Community Innova-
tion Survey (CIS) and follows its methodology. The MIP covers both manufacturing and
service sectors. It is conducted as a mail survey including an option to respond online.
Only the MIP 2009 and the MIP 2015 wave include questions on environmental action.
The MIP 2015 is used for the main analysis and the MIP 2009 is used for robustness
checks. The sample consists of 2,691 firms from the 2015 wave and 3,612 firms14 from the
2009 wave. The two different waves are analyzed separately because the questionnaire
changed between both waves and items differ. Moreover, the number of valid observations
is smaller in the MIP 2015. Therefore, analyzing both waves jointly would give a higher
weight on years further back. The MIP 2015 gross sample consists of 29,370 enterprises
with 7,212 firms (net sample) providing usable data. The response rate is 25%. The
net sample of the MIP 2009 consists of 7,657 firms, corresponding to a response rate of
26%. Sector and size composition of both net samples do not differ significantly from
respective gross samples. This indicates representativeness regarding the sector and size
distribution of the German firm population (Rammer et al. 2016). However, not all
observations from the net samples are included in the analysis. The applied items have
a considerable number of missing values.15 Consequently, a Heckman selection model is
applied to test for a non-random sorting of firms (Heckman 1979). The inverse Mills ratio
is not significant. Hence, a selection bias can be ruled out.16
3.3.2 Variable description
Table 2 (dependent variable) and Table 3 (independent variables) provide descriptive
statistics of the model variables for all observations (ALL) as well as for SME and LE
separately and for both waves. SME are defined as all firms with less than 250 employees
and an annual revenue of less than e50 Million. LE are all other firms. The MIP 2015
sample contains 78% (2,093) SME and 22% (598) LE and the MIP 2009 sample contains
83.1% (3000) SME and 16.9% (612) LE.17
is considered to be the worldwide most extensive (Jordan 2012).
14 The number of observations differs from Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014) because of differences in the
data preparation process.
15 Missing values of control variables are imputed by the sector mean of the respective size class.
16 The results of the Heckman selection model are available from the author upon request.
17 Dividing firms merely by two groups (SME and LE) allows concluding about firm size differences
with respect to only one graduation. Nevertheless, only one graduation is chosen to insure sufficiently
large sample sizes.
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The MIP gathers information concerning ROS by asking firms about earnings before taxes
(EBT) as a percentage of turnover. Firms do not have to reveal the exact number, they
choose between nine intervals as illustrated in Table 2. ROS is measured at the end of
the reference period (2014 for MIP 2015) and at the middle of the reference period (2013
for MIP 2015), but ROS measured at the end of the reference period is used as dependent
variable. In both waves the median return on sales lies in the interval ’4% to <7%’ for all
observations as well as for SME. For LE it lies in the interval ’2% to <4%’. Hence, the
median return on sales is generally higher for SME.18
Table 2: Summary statistics of the dependent variable.
Size class
Pre-tax return on sales LE SME ALL
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
MIP 2015
below -5% 30 5.0 156 7.5 186 6.9
-5% to < -2% 17 2.8 68 3.2 85 3.2
-2% to < 0% 27 4.5 89 4.3 116 4.3
0% to < 2% 113 18.9 300 14.3 413 15.3
2% to < 4% 122 20.4 329 15.7 451 16.8
4% to < 7% 113 18.9 351 16.8 464 17.2
7% to < 10% 78 13.0 261 12.5 339 12.6
10% to <15% 57 9.5 230 11.0 287 10.7
15% and more 41 6.9 309 14.8 350 13.0
Total 598 100.0 2093 100.0 2691 100.0
MIP 2009
below 0% 80 13.1 361 12.0 441 12.2
0% to < 2% 119 19.4 540 18.0 659 18.2
2% to < 4% 111 18.1 501 16.7 612 16.9
4% to < 7% 119 19.4 510 17.0 629 17.4
7% to < 10% 77 12.6 391 13.0 468 13.0
10% to < 15% 62 10.1 351 11.7 413 11.4
15% and more 44 7.2 346 11.5 390 10.8
Total 612 100.0 3000 100.0 3612 100.0
Source: MIP 2015 & MIP 2009; own calculation.
The MIP 2015 asks in a question based on the harmonized CIS questionnaire whether an
environmental process innovation has been implemented within the last three years,
18 According to a Pearson’s chi-squared test, the distribution of ROS significantly differs between SME
and LE (MIP 2015: p-value < 0.001, MIP 2009: p-value = 0.04). See Plackett (1983) for a method
description of the Pearson’s chi-squared test. The distribution of SME is greater at the highest and
at the lowest ROS-interval; and the distribution of LE is higher in the middle of the ROS-intervals.
This is in line with deviating business risks between SME and LE because SME have usually fewer
projects, which can either be successful or fail. Thus, they are more likely to be found in extreme
intervals.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the independent variables. SME & LE in brackets.
Variable Wave Timing N (SME/LE) Mean (SME/LE) Std. D. (SME/LE) Min. Max.
Environmental innovation
EI 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.57 (0.52/ 0.73) 0.50 (0.50/ 0.44) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.57 (0.55/ 0.71) 0.49 (0.50/ 0.45) 0 1
EI panel 2015 2012-2 947 (769/ 205) 0.54 (0.49/ 0.68) 0.50 (0.50/ 0.47) 0 1
2009 2006-2 947 (769/ 205) 0.57 (0.55/ 0.68) 0.49 (0.50/ 0.47) 0 1
Same EI both 974 (769/ 205) 0.31 (0.28/ 0.44) 0.46 (0.45/ 0.50) 0 1
in both waves
Regulation 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.26 (0.21/ 0.43) 0.44 (0.41/ 0.49) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.23 (0.20/ 0.37) 0.42 (0.40/ 0.48) 0 1
Regulation & resource 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.23 (0.19/ 0.39) 0.42 (0.39/ 0.49) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.18 (0.16/ 0.32) 0.39 (0.36/ 0.47) 0 1
Regulation & other 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.18 (0.14/ 0.32) 0.39 (0.35/ 0.47) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.19 (0.17/ 0.33) 0.40 (0.37/ 0.47) 0 1
Voluntary & resource 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.25 (0.25/ 0.25) 0.43 (0.43/ 0.43) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.28 (0.27/ 0.30) 0.45 (0.45/ 0.46) 0 1
Voluntary & other 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.15 (0.15/ 0.17) 0.36 (0.35/ 0.37) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.21 (0.21/ 0.24) 0.41 (0.40/ 0.43) 0 1
Control variables
Pressure of increasing 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.31 (0.27/0.44) 0.46 (0.44/ 0.50) 0 1
input prices 2009 [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Market novelty 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.18 (0.16/ 0.25) 0.39 (0.37/ 0.44) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.21 (0.20/ 0.29) 0.41 (0.40/ 0.45) 0 1
Cost-saving innovation 2015 2012-2 2.691 (2,093/598) 0.16 (0.13/ 0.25) 0.36 (0.34/ 0.43) 0 1
2009 2006-2 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.21 (0.18/ 0.36) 0.41 (0.38/ 0.48) 0 1
Market share 2015 2014 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.15 (0.13/ 0.22) 0.26 (0.25/ 0.26) <0.01 1
2009 2008 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.17 (0.16/ 0.24) 0.26 (0.26/ 0.27) <0.01 1
Competition pressure 2015 2014 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.59 (0.60/ 0.55) 0.49 (0.49/ 0.49) 0 1
2009 2008 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.54 (0.54/ 0.57) 0.50 (0.50/ 0.49) 0 1
Use of IPR 2015 2014 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.26 (0.21/ 0.44) 0.44 (0.41/ 0.50) 0 1
2009 [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Assets-to-sales ratio 2015 2014 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.38 (0.38/ 0.36) 0.71 (0.71/ 0.70) <0.01 6.92
2009 2008 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.37 (0.38/ 0.34) 0.78 (0.80/ 0.67) <0.01 8.37
Employees (in logs) 2015 2014 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 3.67 (3.08/ 5.75) 1.60 (1.16/ 1.10) 0 8.82
2009 2008 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 3.76 (3.28/ 6.11) 1.56 (1.18/ 0.96) 0 8.44
Firm in East Germany 2015 2014 2.691 (2,093/ 598) 0.32 (0.36/ 0.17) 0.47 (0.48/ 0.38) 0 1
2009 2008 3,612 (3,000/ 612) 0.30 (0.34/ 0.14) 0.46 (0.47/ 0.35) 0 1
a Lagged return on sales dummies and sector dummies are excluded.
b Source: MIP 2015 & MIP 2009; own calculation.
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differentiating by nine types of process-related EI. Answers are given on a three-point
Likert Scale (no, minor or high environmental benefits) in 2015 and on a four-point Likert
Scale (no, minor, medium or high environmental benefits) in 2009. However, the MIP
does not quantify how many EI a company implemented. To estimate the effect of all
environmental innovations, a dummy variable EI is generated which takes the value ’one’
for all firms that implemented at least one environmental process innovation (regardless of
the extent of environmental benefits) and the value ’zero’ for all observations who answered
”no”. In both waves, 57% of all firms implemented an environmental innovation. Dividing
the sample by size and wave reveals that in the MIP 2015 wave only 52% of all SME, but
73% of all LE implemented an environmental innovation. In the 2009 wave, 55% of all
SME and 71% of all LE reported to be environmentally active. Hence, a large difference
exists between both groups and the difference increased between both waves. A Pearson’s
chi-squared test confirms that the likelihood to implement an environmental innovation
significantly differs between SME and LE in both waves (p-value ≤ 0.01).
In the second step of my empirical strategy, I estimate the effect of environmental in-
novation on firm profitability with respect to the four different types of environmental
innovation. At first, I divide environmental innovations into regulation-driven and
voluntary. I define environmental innovations that were implemented for the reasons
of regulation standards, tax measures and expected regulations as regulation-driven.19
All remaining environmental innovations I consider as voluntary. Thereafter, regulation-
induced and voluntary innovations are divided into resource efficiency-improving and other
innovations. Resource efficiency-improving EI include innovations which ”reduced energy
use per unit of output” or ”reduced material or water use per unit of output”. Other
EI include innovations that ”reduced air emissions” (except CO2), ”reduced water or soil
pollution”, ”reduced noise pollution”, ”replaced fossil energy sources with renewable energy
sources” or ”replaced materials with less hazardous substitutes”. Two further dimensions of
environmental innovations are excluded from the analysis because they cannot be assigned
unambiguously to either of the two types, these are EI with ”reduced CO2 emissions” or
”improved recycling of materials, waste or water”.
19 MIP 2015: All firms that reported to be at least on a medium level (four-point Likert Scale) influenced
by the mentioned reasons; MIP 2009: All firms that answered with ”yes”.
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A problem occurs in this step because the influence of regulation has not been observed
independently for each dimension of environmental benefits. Table 9 in the Appendix
illustrates the problem with MIP 2015 data. 768 firms (505 SME and 263 LE) are ob-
served with both, resource efficiency-improving and other innovations, and out of them
445 firms (270 SME and 175 LE) reported that innovations were induced by regulation.
Consequently, 445 observations exist in the MIP 2015 with ambiguous assignments of reg-
ulation, which is considered as a further data restriction. A robustness check conducted by
Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014) indicates, however, that it does not affect the main findings
whether a positive regulation status is attributed only to resource efficiency-improving in-
novations, only to other innovations or to both types. Also, it is likely that environmental
law does not only induce resource or only other innovations within one firm. It is rather
likely that both types were induced by regulation. Hence, resource and other innovations
are both classified as regulation-induced in this work if a firm reported both innovation
types as well as the influence of regulation.
Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of firms with different types of environmental innova-
tion for both MIP waves. The first picture shows the number of environmental innovation
for all firms. In the 2009 wave, voluntary & resource innovations (VR) are the most
widespread with 28% and regulation & resource innovation (RR) the rarest with 18%.
19% of all firms introduced a regulation & other innovation (RO) and 21% a voluntary
& other innovation (VO). In the 2015 wave, only 25% introduced a voluntary & resource
innovation, only 18% a regulation & other innovation and 15% a voluntary & other in-
novation. Hence, most types of environmental innovation decreased from 2009 to 2015.
However, regulation & resource innovations increased up to 23%. The second picture
shows only SME. In both waves, voluntary & resource innovations are the most common
in SME. In the 2009 wave, 27% of all SME implemented one and in 2015 at least every
fourth SME introduced one. Additionally, the second largest share were voluntary &
other innovations (21%) for the MIP 2009. That changed in the 2015 wave. Voluntary &
other innovations dropped down to 15% and SME with regulation & resource innovations
increased from 16% to 19%. The third picture shows LE. In the 2009 wave, regulation &
other innovations were the most prevalent (33%). In the 2015 wave, regulation & resource
innovations were the most common (39%). Like for SME, only the share of this type in-
creased between both waves. Moreover, LE show a higher share of regulation-induced
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environmental innovations in comparison to SME. This can have different reasons. First,
LE generally show a higher share of any innovative activity, which simply reflects that the
probability that a certain event occurs within a certain period of time tends to increase
by the size of an organization. In addition, LE might be more exposed to regulation
than SME, or LE may implement more often environmental innovations in response to
regulation.
Figure 1: Average number of firms with an environmental innovation by different inno-
vation types (Source: MIP 2015 & MIP 2009; own calculation).
The following control variables are included in the empirical model:20 The dummy variable
market novelty controls for price setting advantages due to product differentiation (PD).
It takes the value ’one’ if a firm introduced at least one product that is new to the market
and ’zero’ otherwise. On average, 16% of all SME and 27% of all LE introduced a market
novelty in the MIP 2015 wave. Moreover, process innovations (PC) decrease costs and
increase profits due to improvements in the firm-specific cost structure (CS). Accordingly,
the dummy variable cost-saving innovation captures all firms which implemented at
least one cost-reducing process innovation in the respective period as ’one’ and ’zero’
otherwise. 25% of all LE and only 13% of all SME are observed with a cost-reducing
process innovation (MIP 2015). Besides, not only environmental innovations declined
between both waves, but also cost-saving innovations as well as market novelties. A
20 Only descriptive statistics of the main analysis (MIP 2015) are reported in the text.
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firm’s knowledge stock (KS) is difficult to measure. Fortunately, firms that produce
novel knowledge are likely to protect their knowledge by means of intellectual property
rights (IPR) while other firms do not. Hence, firms’ use of IPR is taken as a proxy for KS.
Therefore, the dummy variable use of IPR takes the value ’one’ if a firm used intellectual
property rights and it takes the value ’zero’ otherwise. Information about the use of IPR
is only provided in the MIP 2015. 44% of all LE but only 21% of all SME reported to use
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, competition pressure (CP) is measured by
a dummy which is ’one’ if at least three of the following questions were answered with
”applies fully” or ”applies mainly”21: 1.”Are products and services from competitors easily
substituted by those of your enterprise?” 2.”Is the entry of new competitors a major threat
to your market position?” 3.”Are competitors’ actions difficult to predict?” 4.”Is costumer
demand development difficult to predict?” 5.”Is your firm facing strong competition from
abroad? 6.”Do price increases lead to immediate loss of clients?”. In the MIP 2015, 60%
of all SME reported a high competition intensity, 5% more than LE.
In order to take into account sector-specific differences, 21 sector dummies based on a two-
digit NACE code are integrated in the econometric model as well.22 Firm size is included
in every estimation since economies of scale may also affect regular unit costs. The variable
is measured by the natural logarithm of employees at full-time equivalents at the end of
the reference period. Another driver—especially of resource efficiency improvements—are
increased (relative) energy and material prices (Rexha¨user & Rammer 2014, Popp 2002,
Newell et al. 1999, Jaffe & Stavins 1995). Thus, the effect of environmental innovations
on profitability could be biased due to impacts of resource price changes. The dummy
variable pressure of increasing input prices controls for this, which is only reported
in the MIP 2015. It is ’one’ if a firm stated that cost-saving motivations were ”high” or
”medium” important for introducing an EI and ’zero’ otherwise. On average, 27% of all
SME and 44% of all LE reported increasing input prices as a motivation. Furthermore,
firm profitability may be influenced by a firm’s market share because it increases market
power and allows setting higher price (Buzzell et al. 1975).23 According to the MIP 2015,
21 The two highest answers on a four-point Likert scale.
22 The sectors are presented in Table 8 in the Appendix.
23 Besides, market share is related to competition intensity (CP) and is an indicator for productivity
(Ravenscraft 1983, Foster et al. 2008, Shepherd 1972), and therefore, related to the firm’s cost
structure (CS) as well.
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LE possess a market share of 22% and SME of 13% on average. Moreover, East Germany
is characterized by specific economic and institutional structures. Consequently, market
and firm-specific characteristics may depend on the firm’s location. The dummy firm in
East Germany takes the value ’one’ if a firm is located in the eastern part of Germany
and it has the value ’zero’ otherwise. 36% of all SME and 17% of all LE in the sample are
located in East Germany.24 Furthermore, the asset-to-sales ratio, which is a firm’s asset
divided by its total revenue, is included because it is an indicator of an industries’ capital
requirements (Rexha¨user & Rammer 2014); and therefore, connected to market-specific
characteristics.25 The average asset-to-sales ratio for SME is 38% and for LE 36%. Thus,
capital intensity only slightly differs between both groups.
24 The share of firms located in East Germany in the MIP sample is higher than in the total population
of firms due to oversampling.
25 Moreover, the asset-to-sales ratio is related to market entry barriers. Thus, it is linked to competition
intensity (CP) as well.
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4 Results
4.1 First step: EI in general
Table 4: First step: Environmental innovation in general.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Return on sales in percent ALL SME LE ALL
Environmental innovation
EI 0.715∗ 0.838∗ 0.0713 2.313∗∗
(0.355) (0.419) (0.668) (0.708)
Interaction term with employees (in logs)
EI & employees -0.463∗∗
(0.178)
Control variables
Pressure of increasing -1.084∗∗ -1.204∗∗ -0.560 -1.014∗∗
input prices (0.361) (0.450) (0.551) (0.361)
Market novelty 0.341 0.420 0.254 0.323
(0.383) (0.483) (0.575) (0.383)
Cost-saving innovation 1.046∗∗ 1.168∗ 0.527 1.087∗∗
(0.393) (0.504) (0.576) (0.393)
Market share 2.172∗∗∗ 1.924∗∗ 3.119∗∗∗ 2.162∗∗∗
(0.552) (0.667) (0.938) (0.551)
Competition pressure -1.411∗∗∗ -1.806∗∗∗ -0.195 -1.420∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.339) (0.467) (0.280)
Use of IPR 0.251 -0.209 1.297∗ 0.319
(0.351) (0.438) (0.556) (0.352)
Assets-to-sales ratio -0.700∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗ -0.914∗ -0.707∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.238) (0.366) (0.200)
Employees (in logs) -0.422∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗ -0.0126 -0.152
(0.0947) (0.147) (0.227) (0.140)
Firm in East Germany -0.162 -0.326 0.748 -0.169
(0.293) (0.337) (0.615) (0.293)
Sector X X X X
Constant 8.940∗∗∗ 9.190∗∗∗ 5.883∗∗∗ 8.061∗∗∗
(0.815) (1.043) (1.536) (0.880)
lnsigma 1.901∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗ 1.669∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0189) (0.0327) (0.0163)
N 2691 2093 598 2691
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: MIP 2015; own calculation.
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Results of the first step are illustrated in Table 4. Estimating all firms jointly, ROS
increases by 0.72 percentage points on average if a firm has an environmental innovation.
Estimations (2) and (3) reveal, however, that a positive significant coefficient is only
observable for SME (0.84 percentage points on average). Thus, the general positive effect
observed in estimation (1) is rather driven by SME. Comparing the EI coefficients of
estimations (2) and (3) by means of a Wald test shows that the difference between both
groups is not significant (p-value = 0.33). Employing the interaction term (estimation
(4)) confirms, however, that the positive effect of EI diminishes when the number of
employees increases. Hence, the smaller the number of employees, the higher the benefits
of environmental innovations. Besides, the estimated coefficient of the environmental
innovation dummy (2.31 percentage points on average) becomes larger when applying the
interaction term.
4.2 Second step: Different types of EI
In the second step, I analyze which EI types drive the general relationship between EI and
ROS. Table 5 presents the results. According to estimation (1), none of the four innova-
tion types is significant. Estimation (2) and (3) show how results change when SME and
LE are estimated separately. Estimation (2) illustrates that for SME regulation-induced
resource efficiency improvements are significantly related to an increase in ROS by 1.46
percentage points on average, whereas the three other types have no significant effects.
Hence, profitability increases due to EI can only be supported for regulation & resource
innovations. Estimation (3) reveals that the same EI type decreases profitability in LE by
1.81 percentage points on average. Other EI types do not show any significant effects for
LE as well. A Wald test confirms that the effect of regulation-induced resource efficiency
improvements significantly differs between both groups (p-value < 0.01). Table 2 illus-
trates that most firms have relative profits between -5% and 10%. Thus, effect differences
at this size indicate a huge difference in profitability. Estimation (4) shows how the four
innovation types interact with firm size. The coefficient of regulation-induced resource
innovations increases up to 4.03 percent points on average. Hence, the positive correla-
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Table 5: Second step: Different environmental innovation types.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Return on sales in percent ALL SME LE ALL
Environmental innovation
Regulation & resource 0.451 1.455∗ -1.814∗ 4.027∗∗
(0.552) (0.705) (0.805) (1.423)
Regulation & other 0.0822 0.0917 -0.562 -1.338
(0.538) (0.702) (0.749) (1.507)
Voluntary & resource 0.443 0.656 -0.790 1.977∗
(0.396) (0.459) (0.780) (0.997)
Voluntary & other -0.296 -0.433 0.338 -1.525
(0.445) (0.525) (0.814) (1.229)
Interaction terms with employees (in logs)
Regulation & resource & employees -0.887∗∗
(0.317)
Regulation & other & employees 0.335
(0.333)
Voluntary & resource & employees -0.438
(0.254)
Voluntary & other & employees 0.320
(0.302)
Control variables
Pressure of increasing -0.986∗ -1.465∗∗ 0.566 -0.977∗
input prices (0.388) (0.475) (0.614) (0.388)
Market novelty 0.375 0.461 0.384 0.370
(0.384) (0.482) (0.574) (0.383)
Cost-saving innovation 1.075∗∗ 1.125∗ 0.700 1.106∗∗
(0.394) (0.505) (0.571) (0.394)
Market share 2.164∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗ 3.181∗∗∗ 2.126∗∗∗
(0.552) (0.667) (0.934) (0.551)
Competition pressure -1.410∗∗∗ -1.829∗∗∗ -0.116 -1.419∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.339) (0.464) (0.280)
Use of IPR 0.252 -0.207 1.390∗ 0.310
(0.352) (0.438) (0.555) (0.353)
Assets-to-sales ratio -0.707∗∗∗ -0.727∗∗ -0.967∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.238) (0.364) (0.200)
Employees (in logs) -0.412∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗ 0.0173 -0.196
(0.0946) (0.147) (0.225) (0.128)
Firm in East Germany -0.164 -0.311 0.657 -0.137
(0.294) (0.337) (0.612) (0.293)
Sector X X X X
Constant 9.109∗∗∗ 9.290∗∗∗ 6.276∗∗∗ 8.300∗∗∗
(0.810) (1.038) (1.511) (0.868)
lnsigma 1.902∗∗∗ 1.952∗∗∗ 1.661∗∗∗ 1.899∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0189) (0.0327) (0.0163)
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N 2691 2093 598 2691
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: MIP 2015; own calculation.
tion between this innovation type and profits in firms with just a few employees is very
high. Moreover, the coefficient of voluntary resource innovations becomes significant with
a coefficient size of 1.98 percentage points. Looking at the interaction terms, regulation-
induced resource innovations have a negative significant coefficient (-0.89). Consequently,
the estimated coefficient of regulation-induced resource innovations decreases if the num-
ber of employees increases. The interaction term of voluntary resource innovations also
shows a negative relationship, but the interaction term is only significant at a 10% level
with a p-value of 0.09. Moreover, the main effect of employees in logs is not significant
anymore, which indicates that the size coefficients especially in estimations (1) and (2)
capture some size effects of environmental innovations.
In summary, the results show that environmental innovations in general are positively re-
lated to ROS. Splitting the observations between SME and LE indicates that the positive
effect can only be attributed to SME, but this difference is not significant. Employing
the interaction term, however, confirms that the positive effect of EI diminishes when the
number of employees increases. Dividing environmental innovations by possible combi-
nations of resource and regulation status indicates that differences are mainly driven by
regulation-induced resource innovations. Including interaction terms in the second step
shows that profitability increases with both types of resource innovations, but benefits are
higher and significantly size-dependent when the innovation is regulation-driven. Besides,
coefficients of other innovation types are not significant.
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Table 6: MIP 2009.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return on sales in percent ALL SME LE ALL 2009 ALL 2015
Environmental innovation
Regulation & resource 1.010∗ 1.154∗ 0.211 1.202 3.388∗
(0.456) (0.522) (0.901) (1.239) (1.332)
Regulation & other -0.462 -0.766 0.858 -0.901 -1.359
(0.444) (0.507) (0.875) (1.208) (1.431)
Voluntary & resource 0.588 0.592 0.516 0.765 1.610
(0.302) (0.331) (0.749) (0.795) (0.945)
Voluntary& other -0.208 -0.182 -0.216 -0.590 -1.293
(0.322) (0.355) (0.772) (0.857) (1.168)
Interaction terms with employees (in logs)
Regulation & resource & employees -0.0513 -0.872∗∗
(0.291) (0.301)
Regulation & other & employees 0.111 0.350
(0.286) (0.316)
Voluntary & resource & employees -0.0503 -0.417
(0.204) (0.242)
Voluntary& other & employees 0.104 0.274
(0.216) (0.288)
Control variables
Market novelty 0.266 -0.0503 1.203∗ 0.266 0.413
(0.270) (0.308) (0.531) (0.270) (0.352)
Cost-saving innovation 0.365 0.565 -0.505 0.364 1.147∗∗
(0.275) (0.318) (0.511) (0.275) (0.373)
Market share 1.811∗∗∗ 1.736∗∗∗ 2.294∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.450) (0.889) (0.402) (0.525)
Competition pressure -1.127∗∗∗ -1.192∗∗∗ -0.918∗ -1.129∗∗∗ -1.409∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.237) (0.459) (0.212) (0.266)
Assets-to-sales ratio -0.498∗∗∗ -0.457∗∗ -1.078∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗
(0.149) (0.162) (0.406) (0.149) (0.192)
Employees (in logs) -0.426∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ 0.243 -0.448∗∗∗ -0.264∗
(0.0729) (0.104) (0.244) (0.102) (0.122)
Firm in East Germany -0.153 -0.225 0.304 -0.153 -0.248
(0.229) (0.247) (0.649) (0.229) (0.279)
Constant 5.840∗∗∗ 6.494∗∗∗ 0.515 5.927∗∗∗ 8.270∗∗∗
(0.595) (0.684) (1.836) (0.655) (0.824)
lnsigma 1.789∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗ 1.789∗∗∗ 1.841∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0160) (0.0345) (0.0145) (0.0174)
Observations 3612 3000 612 3612 2691
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: MIP 2015 & MIP 2009; own calculation.
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5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Analyzing the MIP 2009
Contrary to the findings from Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014), the results of this work show
that different EI types do not have a significant relation to ROS if size differences are not
considered. However, coefficients of control variables used in both studies barely differ in
their direction and significance level.
Different EI coefficients in both studies can occur for more than one reason. On the one
hand, several differences in the empirical approach exist. First, environmental innovation
dummies are defined differently: CO2 emissions are not considered as resource efficiency
improvements in the current study. But including CO2 as a dimension of resource effi-
ciency improvements—like Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014)—would also show insignificant
results for the MIP 2015.26 Secondly, the questionnaire changed between both waves.
The response categories of the question ’whether an environmental innovation was imple-
mented’ changed from a four-point to a three-point Likert Scale. Thirdly, different control
variables are used and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is excluded from the analysis be-
cause it does not show any effect in Rexha¨user & Rammer’s (2014) paper.
On the other hand, relationships may have changed. To put it more precisely, the rela-
tionship between EI types and profitability may differ between both periods. This could
be because returns of environmental innovations decreased especially for LE between the
2009 and the 2015 wave, but not for SME. This would indicate that size differences might
vary over time.
To identify which issue causes the difference, the second step of the main analysis is
repeated with MIP 2009 data. However, the same set of control variables is not available
in both waves. Consequently, the analysis is only conducted with variables that are
available for both periods.27 The results are presented in Table 6. Estimation (1) shows
26 The results are available from the author upon request.
27 An estimation with same empirical approach as Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014) use was conducted as
well. Except some minor differences it was possible to replicate their results.
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that most EI coefficients still differ from Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014). Hence, differences
in the empirical approach—i.e. a modified questionnaire and a different set of control
variables—cause diverging results. But regulation-induced resource innovations still have
a significant coefficient. Therefore, the relationship between regulation-induced resource
innovations and profitability seems to be robust for the MIP 2009 because it is significant
in both, my study as well as Rexha¨user & Rammer’s (2014).
Even though the empirical approach causes diverging results, relationships still may have
changed between both waves. Estimations (2) and (3) show results of both groups with
MIP 2009 data and this study’s empirical approach. The coefficient of regulation-induced
resource improvements remains significant only for SME, but not for LE. However, the
coefficients between both groups do not differ significantly according to a Wald test. This
indicates that size differences have no strong impact in the MIP 2009. Hence, the analyzed
time period may determine profitability gains of EI and respective size differences. In
estimations (4) and (5) a regression with interaction terms is conducted with the same set
of control variables for both waves. Estimation (4) presents results for the MIP 2009 and
estimation (5) for the MIP 2015. In estimation (4) none of the coefficients is significant,
but results of estimation (5) are similar to the main findings presented in Table 5 in
section 4. Thus, for the MIP 2015 size differences are significant and robust, whereas
for the MIP 2009 size differences cannot be observed. A Wald test indicates that the
interaction term related to regulation-induced resource innovations significantly differs
between both estimations (p-value = 0.04). Therefore, the size-dependency of EI changed
between both waves.
As relationships changed, it is important to identify why and how firm size is related to it.
If a firm starts to be environmentally active, it will probably first choose EI that reduce
environmental pollution at low cost. However, the more environmental innovations a firm
implements, the more difficult it might get to find another EI which is at least cost neutral.
Hence, the development of new ways to reduce environmental pollution is likely to become
more expensive over time, especially for developers of new processes. Since the start of a
new federal government in Germany in 1998, formed by a coalition of the social democratic
party and the green party, environmental policy has gained importance in Germany. A
lot of the present environmental regulations were introduced in the early 2000s (Ja¨nicke
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Table 7: The influence of former EI.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Return on sales in percent ALL SME LE
Environmental innovation
EI 1.530∗ 1.119 2.497∗
(0.650) (0.762) (1.214)
EI 2009 0.585 0.544 1.560
(0.566) (0.653) (1.115)
Same EI in both waves -0.481 0.127 -2.647∗
(0.732) (0.877) (1.280)
Control variables
Pressure of increasing -1.892∗∗ -1.915∗ -1.440
input prices (0.626) (0.764) (0.953)
Market novelty 0.124 0.485 -0.842
(0.658) (0.807) (1.031)
Cost-saving innovation 0.885 0.684 0.776
(0.677) (0.855) (1.033)
Market share 2.546∗∗ 2.312∗ 3.393∗
(0.849) (1.031) (1.433)
Competition pressure -1.333∗∗ -1.810∗∗ 0.192
(0.464) (0.555) (0.782)
Use of IPR 0.386 -1.061 3.464∗∗∗
(0.601) (0.739) (0.998)
Assets-to-sales ratio -0.673∗ -0.698∗ -0.581
(0.299) (0.351) (0.558)
Employees (in logs) -0.433∗∗ -0.355 -0.265
(0.160) (0.241) (0.395)
Firm in East Germany 0.537 0.705 0.188
(0.483) (0.546) (1.132)
Sector X X X
Constant 9.326∗∗∗ 9.837∗∗∗ 5.795∗
(1.270) (1.580) (2.487)
lnsigma 1.890∗∗∗ 1.931∗∗∗ 1.598∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0311) (0.0564)
N 974 769 205
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: MIP 2015 & MIP 2009; own calculation.
2009). Therefore, between 2006 and 2008 (the reference period of the MIP 2009) it might
have been easier for firms to find and introduce profitable resource-efficiency increasing EI
than between 2012 and 2014 (the reference period of the MIP 2015). Increasing costs of
EI are likely to hit SME later than LE or less because they are less often environmentally
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active and struggle more with resource efficiency improvements. Hence, the point where
reducing environmental pollution harms SME’s profitability might not have been reached
during the reference period of the MIP 2015. Besides, a decreasing profitability of EI
might also explain why the total amount of voluntary EI declined between both MIP
waves (see Table 3).
To test this assumption, I analyze how former environmental innovations affect the re-
lationship between environmental innovation and firm size. I combine both MIP waves
to analyze the issue. My sample of firms that participated in both survey waves and
provided full information on the model variables consists of 974 firms (769 SME and 205
LE). Moreover, this part of my analysis consists of three regressions. First, I test the
influence of former EI on all firms jointly. Second, I split the sample into SME and LE.
I conduct my analysis based on equation (1), but adding two new variables. First, I add a
dummy variable which is ’one’ when an EI was implemented between 2006 and 2008 and
’zero’ otherwise. Second, I add a dummy variable indicating whether an EI with the same
dimensions of environmental benefits was introduced in both waves by the same firm.
The dummy is ’one’, for example, when a firm has introduced an EI which saves water
in both periods. Unfortunately, no other MIP wave between 2009 and 2015 asked about
environmental innovation. Therefore, some noise in the data exists due to the issue that
I do not know whether a firm implemented an environmental innovation in the periods
not covered by the waves 2009 and 2015 (i.e. in the years 2009 to 2011). Also, a selection
bias is possible, as firms observed in the MIP 2009 and in the MIP 2015 again may have
a higher profitability on average. This is because unprofitable firms might have left the
market between both periods. Accordingly, the sample of firms that participated in both
survey waves can significantly differ from the main sample (MIP 2015). Therefore, I
test whether my subsample differs from it. A chi-squared test is applied for all discrete
variables. Except for ’use of IPR’ and ’pressure of increasing input prices’, the null that
both samples are drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected. For continuous
variables, I employ the nonparametric two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test for
equality of the overall cumulative distributions. The hypothesis of equal distributions for
all continuous variables can also not be rejected here. Hence, I assume the subsample is
representative for my entire sample.
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The results are presented in Table 7. The first estimation shows that only EI exclu-
sively implemented in the 2012-2014 period have a significant effect on profitability. In
estimation (2), EI coefficients are not significant but point all into a positive direction.
The sample is much smaller than in the main analysis and there is some multicollinearity
between the coefficients, which explains why the coefficients of this estimation may not
be significant anymore. However, estimation (3) now shows some positive effects for LE
even though this sample is smaller: EI implemented between 2012 and 2014 have a signif-
icant positive coefficient of 2.5 percentage points on average. But if an EI with the same
environmental benefits of an earlier EI was implemented, it reduces the relationship by
2.65 percentage points on average. Accordingly, both effects neutralize each other and a
firm that implemented EI with the same dimension of environmental benefits in both pe-
riods does not profit from a potential positive relationship. So continuous environmental
innovation is likely to decrease the positive relationship with profitability after a while in
LE. This result confirms the assumption above. However, it needs further investigation
to validate this hypothesis because there is some noise in the data and the sample is
relatively small. Besides, environmental innovations that were introduced between 2006
and 2008 do not have a significant coefficient when no EI with the same dimension of
environmental benefits was introduced between 2012 and 2014.
5.2 Taking account of past performence
A further analytical issue is potential endogeneity (Verbeek 2008). In other words, not
only environmental innovations might influence firm profitability, but also firm profitabil-
ity might influence the introduction of environmental innovations (King & Lenox 2001,
Nelling & Webb 2009). Firms with higher profitability are likely to have slack resources.
Therefore, they might be more willing to invest in sustainable technologies. Consequently,
an endogeneity problem cannot be ruled out.28 To take into account past performance,
dummy variables for each ROS-interval from 2013 are generated and integrated into the
28 Unfortunately, the interval structure of the ROS variable does not allow to take differences be-
tween two periods. Hence, it is not possible to calculate the change in profits resulting from the
implementation of an EI.
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model as explanatory variables.29 Accordingly, nine dummies capture ROS in 2013. For
example, one dummy takes the value ’one’ if a firm reported a return between 2% and 4%
in 2013 and ’zero’ otherwise. The results from the second step are presented in Table 8.
The integration of lagged ROS-dummies in the model increases the significance of most
of the environmental innovation coefficients in the estimation. However, the size of the
coefficients decreases. But comparing the coefficients with the results shown in Table 5
(main results) by means of a Wald test reveals no significant difference between the two
estimates. Hence, this robustness check does not support the assumption of potential
endogeneity.
6 Discussion & study limitations
Previous literature claims that — besides providing environmental benefits — regulation-
driven environmental innovations increase firm profitability. Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014)
state that this is only valid for innovations that improve resource efficiency. This study
analyses if also firm size influences profitability gains of environmental innovations. My
results show that significant size-dependent differences exist for the MIP 2015 wave. How-
ever, I do not find significant size-dependent differences for the MIP 2009 wave. A Wald
test confirms that coefficients of interaction terms between regulation & resource innova-
tions and firm size differ at a 5% level between both waves. Hence, effects of EI changed
over time. The analysis of the influence of former EI provides an explanation why effects
of EI vary. Table 7 shows that previous EI with the same environmental benefits influ-
ence the effect of present EI in LE negatively. This might be because profitable EI are
more likely when a firm starts to substantially reduce the environmental impacts of its
activities, which in Germany was often the case in the first half of the 2000s, following a
change in federal environmental policy. But the more EI a firm has already implemented
the more difficult it can get to find another profitable EI, which would explain negative
effects in the MIP 2015 for LE as they implemented more EI in the past. However, there
29 The dummies can be interpreted in the following way: Each ROS-interval dummy has a different
likelihood that the ROS in the next period (2014) will be high. A high estimated coefficient of a
profitability dummy indicates a high likelihood that the profitability in the next period will be on a
high level.
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Table 8: Taking account of past performence.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Return on sales in percent ALL SME LE ALL
Environmental innovation
Regulation & resource 0.401 1.070∗∗ -1.110∗∗ 2.235∗∗
(0.296) (0.382) (0.407) (0.773)
Regulation & other -0.0188 -0.167 0.164 -0.371
(0.288) (0.380) (0.378) (0.818)
Voluntary & resource 0.297 0.457 -0.388 1.110∗
(0.215) (0.253) (0.393) (0.550)
Voluntary & other -0.194 -0.297 0.0369 -0.333
(0.239) (0.285) (0.411) (0.668)
Interaction terms with employees (in logs)
Regulation & resource & employees -0.459∗∗
(0.172)
Regulation & other & employees 0.0818
(0.180)
Voluntary & resource & employees -0.232
(0.139)
Voluntary & other & employees 0.0340
(0.164)
Control variables
Pressure of increasing -0.133 -0.289 0.338 -0.130
input prices (0.209) (0.259) (0.310) (0.209)
Market novelty 0.0965 0.0919 0.0135 0.0953
(0.207) (0.263) (0.292) (0.207)
Cost-saving innovation 0.283 0.321 0.127 0.309
(0.214) (0.277) (0.292) (0.214)
Market share 0.474 0.831∗ -0.425 0.455
(0.301) (0.369) (0.481) (0.300)
Competition pressure -0.460∗∗ -0.487∗∗ -0.246 -0.473∗∗
(0.152) (0.187) (0.233) (0.152)
Use of IPR 0.0327 -0.0631 0.391 0.0783
(0.189) (0.238) (0.283) (0.190)
Assets-to-sales ratio -0.222∗ -0.278∗ -0.156 -0.223∗
(0.109) (0.131) (0.188) (0.109)
Employees (in logs) -0.0263 -0.00337 -0.0706 0.125
(0.0516) (0.0813) (0.113) (0.0701)
Firm in East Germany 0.125 0.147 0.292 0.136
(0.159) (0.185) (0.309) (0.159)
Lagged return-on-sales dummiesd
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-5% to < 2% 4.489∗∗∗ 4.672∗∗∗ 4.204∗∗∗ 4.460∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.544) (0.711) (0.447)
-2% to < 0% 5.609∗∗∗ 5.711∗∗∗ 5.463∗∗∗ 5.601∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.482) (0.674) (0.403)
0% to < 2% 6.570∗∗∗ 6.555∗∗∗ 6.481∗∗∗ 6.529∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.404) (0.531) (0.333)
2% to < 4% 8.318∗∗∗ 8.404∗∗∗ 8.008∗∗∗ 8.276∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.405) (0.528) (0.333)
4% to < 7% 10.23∗∗∗ 10.22∗∗∗ 10.32∗∗∗ 10.18∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.395) (0.521) (0.326)
7% to < 10% 13.21∗∗∗ 13.12∗∗∗ 13.20∗∗∗ 13.14∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.413) (0.573) (0.343)
10% to < 15% 16.42∗∗∗ 16.54∗∗∗ 15.99∗∗∗ 16.36∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.439) (0.652) (0.370)
15% and more 22.73∗∗∗ 23.32∗∗∗ 20.63∗∗∗ 22.69∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.502) (0.700) (0.418)
ROS in 2013 missing 10.22∗∗∗ 13.61∗∗∗ 3.094 10.26∗∗∗
(2.086) (2.764) (2.690) (2.082)
Sector X X X X
Constant -4.863∗∗∗ -4.843∗∗∗ -4.404∗∗∗ -5.377∗∗∗
(0.524) (0.666) (0.882) (0.548)
lnsigma 1.234∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0189) (0.0341) (0.0164)
N 2676 2081 595 2676
a Standard errors in parentheses
b ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
c Source: MIP 2015; own calculation.
d Baseline interval: return on sales below -5%
is some noise in the data set, so this argument needs further investigation. Also, another
argument why effects differ is that the effect of regulation on environmental innovation
depends on policy—and policy can vary over time. Hence, effects may diverge for more
than one reason and the first limitation of this study is that I cannot clearly identify the
cause.
Another limitation of my study is that I cannot identify a single cause why effects diverge
between SME and LE in the MIP 2015. According to the literature, possible reasons for
diverging effects between SME and LE include (1.) general differences regarding innova-
tion patterns, (2.) legislative asymmetries and (3.) differences regarding the influence of
regulation on resource efficiency improvements. In theory, general differences can affect
all innovation types. Additionally, regulation may cause legislative asymmetries and dif-
ferences related to resource efficiency improvements like benefits from information gains.
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Theoretically, diverging effects of regulation & resource EI might be caused by all three
factors. As a consequence, it cannot be clearly identified which factor causes diverging
effects. But Table 5 shows that size differences of regulation-induced & resource innova-
tions are larger than those of voluntary & resource ones, which are only driven by general
differences. Hence, regulation either via channel (2.) or (3.) could be one factor influ-
encing size differences of environmental innovation. This argument is also supported by
the descriptive statistics. Table 3 reveals that 43% of all LE and only 21% of all SME
implemented a regulation-induced innovation between 2012 and 2014. In contrast, the
share of firms that implemented a voluntary innovation does not notably differ in both
groups. This indicates that environmental action is more often enforced by law in LE.
Hence, especially enforcement asymmetries (as a part of legislative asymmetries) could
also explain why effects differ. However, it is not possible to identify enforcement asym-
metries based on the MIP 2015 because the influence of regulation is only observed for
firms that introduced an environmental innovation (see section 3.3.2 for a discussion of
this issue). Therefore, this study cannot certainly identify which difference causes diverg-
ing effects between SME and LE and an in-depth investigation, which provides a deeper
understanding, would be appropriate to complement my results.
Moreover, it has to be discussed to what extent my results provide a deeper understanding
about the validity of the Porter hypothesis. The MIP only covers the effect of regulation
when an environmental innovation was introduced. As a consequence, abatements costs
as well as size differences of regulated firms that did not implement an environmental
innovation remain unobserved in this study. Thus, the overall influence of environmental
regulation on firm profitability is not fully analyzed. Therefore, Rexha¨user & Rammer
(2014) state that the applied estimation approach does not allow to confirm the Porter
hypothesis’ strong version. But, one could argue that my results for the MIP 2015 disprove
the Porter hypothesis’ strong version for LE in this period because no positive effect
of EI is found for this group: Abatement costs unambiguously affect firm profitability
negatively and there is no innovation type which could cause an overall positive effect of
regulation on firm profitability. However, this argument does not consider period-specific
effects. The MIP 2009 shows, different effects may exist in other periods. Hence, further
research is needed that captures the combined net effect of pollution abatement costs
and environmental innovations over several periods with respect to firm size. Respective
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results would provide a deeper understanding of the firm size dependency of environmental
innovation and allow making conclusions about the Porter hypothesis’ strong version.
7 Conclusion
Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) state that regulation-induced environ-
mental innovations can increase firm profitability. Rexha¨user & Rammer (2014) show
with the MIP 2009 for the German economy that only resource efficiency-improving inno-
vations increase, while other environmental innovations decrease profitability regardless of
whether regulation-induced or not. As environmental innovation patterns differ between
SME and LE (Klewitz & Hansen 2014), I additionally claim that firm size influences
profitability gains of EI as well. This is because general differences between SME and
LE, legislative asymmetries as well as differences regarding the influence of regulation on
resource efficiency improvements may cause diverging effects.
To test my assumption, I use data from two waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP) consisting in total of 6,303 German firms. The MIP 2015 is used for the main
analysis and the MIP 2009 for robustness checks. My results confirm size differences for the
MIP 2015 wave, which are mainly driven by regulation-induced resource innovations. Such
environmental innovations are significantly related to an increase in profits of SME, but
to a decrease in profits in LE. However, I do not find significant size-dependent difference
in the MIP 2009 wave. That’s why I conclude that the role of firm size differences depends
on the specific time period. One explanation for this result is that profitable EI might
be more likely when a firm starts to substantially reduce the environmental impacts
of its activities, but after a while it is likely that it gets more difficult to find further
profitable EI. As LE implemented more EI in the past already, this issue is more relevant
for them and explains size differences in the MIP 2015 wave. However, size differences in
the MIP 2009 wave are not observable because most firms just might started to reduce
environmental externalities, due to a change in federal policy.
As size differences vary between the observed time periods, it is difficult to define concrete
policy implications. But I recommend that environmental law should take into account
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different innovation patterns between larger and smaller firms and potential legislative
asymmetries. Additionally, policies that provide information about potential technolog-
ical improvements have the chance to increase resource efficiency and especially support
smaller firms.
Due to data restrictions, this study represents only a first approach to the analysis of
firm size differences related to the Porter hypothesis. Further studies should observe the
role of regulation as well as pollution abatement costs for all firms, not solely for those
that implemented an environmental innovation. Additionally, an in-depth (qualitative)
investigation analyzing which differences between SME and LE are the most influential for
diverging effects of regulation-induced resource efficieny improvements would complement
my results. Moreover, the influence of time and regulation regime should be analyzed
more deeply. For example, investigating if and how the rate of environmental innovations
induced by a specific policy varies over time and whether respective effects differ for SME
and LE could provide a deeper insight.
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8 Appendix
Table 9: Observations with an ambiguous assignment of regulation status (MIP 2015).
Type of Group Not influenced Influenced Total
environmental by regulation by regulation
innovation
ALL 353 175 528
Only resource SME 294 118 412
LE 59 57 116
ALL 85 45 130
Only other SME 72 27 99
LE 13 18 31
ALL 323 445 768
Both SME 235 270 505
LE 88 175 263
ALL 1265
No EI SME [-] [-] 1077
LE 188
ALL 2691
Total SME [-] [-] 2093
LE 598
Source: MIP 2015; own calculation.
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